Apple tax slashed by up to 5%, "brought down"

Text | Su Yang

Editor | Xu Qingyang

On March 13, Beijing time, Apple announced that starting March 15, the standard commission rate for the China mainland App Store will be reduced from 30% to 25%, and the preferential rate for small developers and certain projects will be lowered from 15% to 12%.

This adjustment is a rare concession by Apple regarding core commercial terms in the Chinese market and signals a new phase in the ongoing, worldwide “Apple Tax” controversy that has lasted for years.

Apple’s App Store service revenue has long been a key pillar of its “Services” business segment, generating hundreds of billions of dollars annually from global developers. Developers cannot bypass the App Store to sell digital content to iOS users, and this “life-and-death” level control grants Apple near-monopoly pricing power.

Therefore, challenges to this “tax” have never ceased.

Since the founding of the App Store in 2008, Apple has charged developers a 30% transaction fee for digital goods or services sold through its platform, a rate that has persisted for over a decade. In 2020, Apple launched the “Small Business Program,” offering a 15% commission rate to developers with annual revenue below $1 million, but large developers still pay the standard 30%.

01 EU Takes the Lead in Cutting the “Apple Tax”

China is not the first market where Apple successfully lowered commissions globally.

Under regulatory and legal pressures, Apple’s App Store policies have undergone profound changes in several key markets over the past five years. The European Union is the most heavily regulated market impacting Apple.

The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), effective in 2024, designates Apple as a “gatekeeper” platform, requiring it to open up third-party app stores and third-party payment channels. Apple’s initial response was criticized as “superficial compliance”—for example, allowing external payment links in the EU region but still charging up to 27% commission, and setting alarming “scare pop-ups” when users click external links.

In April 2025, the EU Commission issued a €500 million fine to Apple, accusing it of violating DMA regulations through anti-redirect clauses.

Under pressure, Apple introduced a revised EU fee structure in June of that year: the App Store’s standard commission was reduced to 17%, with a 10% rate for small developers and renewal subscriptions; if developers use third-party payment systems, they must pay an additional “Core Technology Fee” (CTC) of about 5%; applications distributed via third-party app stores also pay a 5% CTC. While this tiered system technically lowered the maximum tax rate, it has been widely criticized by developers for its complexity and additional conditions.

Unlike the confrontational stance with the EU, Japan in 2024 passed the “Specific Smartphone Software Promotion Act” (MSCA), requiring the opening of third-party app stores and payment channels, while retaining safety provisions for child protection and fraud prevention.

Apple’s new fee scheme in Japan includes: a 21% commission for large developers, 10% for small developers and certain projects, plus a 5% payment processing fee; applications distributed via third-party stores pay only a 5% CTC—significantly lower than before.

In the U.S. domestic market, Apple has long resisted external payment links citing “security concerns.”

Although the Epic Games vs. Apple lawsuit resulted in a federal antitrust victory for Apple, the court in 2021 issued an injunction requiring Apple to allow developers to add links to external payment websites within apps.

However, Apple delayed compliance, leading the court in 2025 to find it in contempt of court and order the removal of external payment link restrictions and “scare pop-ups.” This opened a window for companies like Spotify and Epic to establish external payment channels in the U.S.—but the overall impact on Apple’s fee system remains limited.

South Korea became the first country to legislatively mandate third-party payment channels in 2021 through an amended “Electrical Communications Business Act.” India, with its rapidly growing smartphone user base, is increasingly becoming a new battleground between Apple and regulators. Simultaneously, lawsuits involving Epic and Apple in Australia are progressing, highlighting a trend of regulatory coordination across multiple countries.

The rising compliance costs and fragmented policies worldwide are becoming the new normal for Apple’s services business.

02 Developers and Users Clash Over the “Apple Tax”

In 2019, Spotify filed an antitrust complaint with the European Commission, accusing Apple of unfairly favoring its own music streaming service, Apple Music, through App Store commission rules—Spotify is forced to pay 30% of subscription revenue to Apple, while Apple Music bypasses this fee entirely.

In 2024, the European Commission ruled against Apple, imposing a hefty fine of €1.84 billion, finding that Apple abused its dominant position as a gatekeeper in the music streaming market. This is the largest single fine to date related to App Store commission policies and has accelerated the implementation of DMA compliance.

In China, beyond developers, users are also challenging the “Apple Tax.”

In November 2024, the Beijing Intellectual Property Court accepted a lawsuit filed by “Tiyundong Technology,” an app developer, against Apple. The company’s children’s posture correction app “Tiyundong” was removed from the App Store in 2020 for “fraudulent behavior” without explanation. Developers see this as a clear case of arbitrary and discriminatory platform control abuse.

In October 2025, 55 iPhone and iPad users, represented by lawyer Wang Qiongfei, jointly filed an administrative complaint with the State Market Supervision Administration, accusing Apple of violating the Anti-Monopoly Law through exclusive App Store distribution, forced in-app purchases, and high commissions. They pointed out that Apple has made concessions in the EU and U.S. but maintains full control over the Chinese market—seen as strong evidence of “differential treatment.”

04 Impact and Controversy of the Tax Reduction

Numerically, the standard rate drops from 30% to 25%, a reduction of about 17%; the small developer preferential rate drops from 15% to 12%.

For larger developers, this means a tangible cost saving.

However, critics argue that 25% remains far above what a purely competitive market would allow; moreover, Apple has not announced opening third-party payment channels or app stores in China, meaning developers still operate within Apple’s rules.

Another noteworthy detail is that Apple explicitly stated that the commission rate in China will be “no higher than the overall rate levels in other markets.”

The issue is that “overall rate levels in other markets” are themselves complex and layered, leaving ample room for future negotiations.

Apple’s service revenue has been growing rapidly, with App Store commissions being one of its most stable cash flows. The tax cut in China will directly impact Apple’s service income, but considering the proportion of China’s App Store revenue in the global total, the short-term financial impact is expected to be within an acceptable range.

More importantly, lowering commissions helps stabilize the developer ecosystem: retaining developers leads to higher app quality and overall platform attractiveness, which is a positive long-term strategy for Apple.

The event of Apple’s tax cut in China appears as a simple five-percentage-point business adjustment on the surface, but behind it lies the decline of the golden era of digital platform dominance.

From the launch of the App Store in 2008 to the 2020s, Apple built a highly profitable digital tollbooth through its closed ecosystem and “walled garden,” with a 30% commission becoming an unavoidable “ticket” for developers.

However, many factors—users, industry, and others—are gradually eroding Apple’s ability to sustain this system.

Special Contributor Wu Ji also contributed to this article.