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A week after Larijani was assassinated, Iran welcomed a new “security chief.” Joulokadet, 72-year-old former deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran with approval from Iran’s Supreme Leader Mujtaba.

Joulokadet taking up the new post means that another veteran of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has entered Iran’s wartime security leadership ranks. Rezaei, the former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq War, has recently been recalled to serve as a military adviser to Supreme Leader Mujtaba. Also, Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Parliament—the negotiating counterpart the United States has been trying to engage—previously headed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force.

Ben Taleblou, head of the Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington think tank, said that Joulokadet’s appointment marks that, under wartime pressure, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has “accelerated the existing process of taking control of the country.”

Joulokadet (screenshot from a report by Peninsula News)

Low-profile veteran

Joulokadet is a member of the first generation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. During the Iran-Iraq War, he led a unit tasked with conducting cross-border operations. That unit later became part of the “Jerusalem Brigade.” After the war, Joulokadet moved into senior ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: first serving for eight years as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, making him the third-highest figure in that force. In 1997, he was promoted to second-in-command, serving as deputy commander for eight years.

Joulokadet entered politics during a period when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ influence was expanding rapidly. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, large numbers of former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps members entered the legislative branch. Among the six candidates in the 2005 presidential election, four—including Ahmadinejad—had backgrounds in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In a highly controversial speech, Joulokadet acknowledged that Iran’s hardline conservative forces helped Ahmadinejad win the election by leveraging a meticulous plan and the large-scale mobilization of the Basij militia organization.

After Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, Joulokadet was appointed deputy minister of the Ministry of Interior, responsible for security and law enforcement affairs. Because at that time Joulokadet was still the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the appointment received special approval from the late Supreme Leader Khamenei. However, two years later, Joulokadet was removed from his cabinet role due to internal struggles. Khamenei then reassigned him to the General Staff of the Armed Forces as deputy chief of staff, overseeing Basij militia affairs.

Around 2010, Joulokadet entered the judicial system and formed close ties with Sadegh, Ahmadinejad’s brother and the then-justice chief. Initially, Joulokadet served as Sadegh’s “adviser on social affairs,” and later was formally appointed deputy minister in charge of social security and crime prevention. During this period, intelligence and interrogation personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gained greater say in the prosecution and trial stages, and their influence on the judicial system increasingly strengthened.

In 2021, Sadegh—by then appointed chair of the Commission for Determining National Interests—appointed Joulokadet as secretary of that commission. The original function of this body at the time it was established was to mediate when the parliament and the Guardian Council had legislative disputes. In 2005, Khamenei also granted the commission oversight power over government departments. Even so, some analysts argue that the commission does not actually hold real power and is more like an “elderly-care institution” for officials.

“Hard on top of hard”

Over the past several decades, Khamenei has continuously strengthened security institutions, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has produced many strong figures. Although Joulokadet has long served in top military posts, his political influence has not been prominent, and he has never managed to break into the core decision-making circle. After Larijani was assassinated, he also was not among the successor candidates predicted by the media and observers.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council is the top body for Iran’s security decision-making. Its members include the Iranian president, the head of the judiciary, the Speaker of Parliament, the foreign minister, the interior minister, the intelligence minister, two representatives appointed by the Supreme Leader, and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Republic of Iran Army. The secretary-general mainly plays a role in bridging and coordinating between parties.

Larijani is widely seen as a pragmatist within the Iranian regime, often acting as a bridge between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hardliners and technical bureaucrats as well as moderates. Since 2021, the Guardian Council has twice revoked his eligibility to run for president, making way for more conservative figures. But after last June’s “war on the 12th,” he was reappointed as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, showing the weight he carries as a mediator. This February, since fighting broke out again, Supreme Leader Mujtaba has remained out of public view, and Larijani has been regarded as the de facto leader of Iran.

Earlier, Middle Eastern media reported that the former Supreme National Security Council secretary Jalili might return. This veteran, who lost his right leg during the Iran-Iraq War, is known for his hardline stance on the nuclear program and relations with the United States. Analysts have noted that, as one of the most hardline hawks inside the regime, Jalili would win support from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. There are also rumors that Larijani’s deputy, Bagheri Kani, would receive a promotion. Unlike Joulokadet, Larijani, Jalili, and Bagheri Kani all have extensive experience in diplomacy and nuclear negotiations.

Talejbou, an expert on Iran at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, said that as people like Joulokadet—who lack experience in international relations and diplomacy—move to the forefront, achieving “a smooth easing of the situation and conflict management” is “hard on top of hard,” perhaps.

Reporter: Chen Jialin

(kalimchen97@gmail.com)

Editor: Xu Fangqing